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AN
IMPARTIAL REVIEW
OF
TWO PAMPHLETS, &c.

(Price One Shilling.)

AN
HISTORICAL REVIEW
OF
THE LITERATURE OF

(1800-1850)

A N
IMPARTIAL REVIEW

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TWO PAMPHLETS lately published,

ONE INTITULED,

AN APOLOGY for a late RESIGNATION:

THE OTHER,

The RESIGNATION Discussed, &c.

IN WHICH

The real INTENTION of both Authors are
clearly exposed, and the real Importance of
that memorable Event, in respect to the
present System at Home and Abroad, is
truly stated.

*Tacitæ magis et occultæ Inimicitie timendæ sunt, quam
indictæ et apertæ.*

Cic. Act. VII. in Verr.

L O N D O N :

Printed for M. COOPER, at the *Globe* in *Pater-*
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IMPARTIAL REVIEW, &c.

IT must certainly afford the highest Pleasure to all true Lovers of Freedom, when they behold all Parties, in their Turn, putting in their Claim to that invaluable Privilege the Liberty of the Press. To this the Patriot has recourse, when he is charged with factious Designs, with fostering Sedition, or countenancing Disaffection. To this the discarded or resigning Minister flies for Relief, when he can no longer bear the Court Climate, or endure the Drudgery of being a Clerk in his Office. To this even Ministers condescend to apply, when they find that the Elevation of their Station will not protect them from Censure, and that in the midst of Power, of Wealth, and of Titles, they are as much the Sport of Fortune, and of vulgar Tongues, as other Men. A clear, a concise Demonstration this, that of all the Benefits enjoyed by a free People,

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there is none so great in itself, so wide in its Extent, or so important in its Consequences, as the Liberty of the Press. By it we have the Power of arraigning bad Measures, and of defending the Right of enquiring into the State of the Nation, and of the Conduct of those who rule us; of detecting false Patriots, and of manifesting to the World, the Worth of those who are truly such; who are content to serve the Publick without Places; who are content also, when it becomes necessary, to serve in them, and are equally content to resign Places, when by keeping them they can serve their Country no longer. All these just and laudable Purposes are most effectually promoted by the Liberty of the Press; nor is there much to be feared from its Abuse, for the Remedy so soon follows the Injury, that, unless we could suppose all the Parts of the Nation to lie on one Side, and all the Probity on the other, which is an absurd and impossible Thing, there can be no great Hurt done. An Answer is as soon wrote as a Libel, and the Publick are such equitable Judges, that if a Man's Pride does not induce him to desert his Cause, or his Passion disable him from defending it, he is sure that Right will be done.

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We have daily Instances of the Truth of all that has been advanced, and therefore it would be needless to go about to prove it; but if that were necessary to be done, a better Proof could hardly be met with, than the Transaction which is to be now the Subject of my Pen. A Man distinguished by every thing that can justly merit the Name of Distinction, by Birth, by Title, by Parts, by Learning, by Wit, by Politeness, and by the highest Pretences to publick Spirit, after making a Figure in Courts, in Senates, in Negotiations, in administering the Government of a great Kingdom, in holding one of the first Posts in the Ministry, thinks proper to retire from Business, and to exchange for the Pleasures of Privacy and Retirement, the Fatigues of a publick Office, and the Load of ministerial Care; that he must have his Reason for this is out of doubt; every prudent Man, even in private Life, takes no Step of any Consequence but from proper Motives; and the more important the Measure is, the stronger and more cogent must those Motives be. In the superior Sphere of Action, without question the Case is the same; for we cannot suppose that Men of Abilities, sufficient to be intrusted with the high Secrets of State, the Rule of Kingdoms, and

the Concern of Nations, act with less Caution, or behave with a slighter Degree of Circumspection than the meaner Rank of People in the ordinary Occurrences of Life. We cannot without doing them the highest Injury conceive that they are led by Passions, governed by Whim, or become the Dupes of Indolence and the Spleen. It is for this Cause that whenever a Matter of this Nature falls out, Conversation is thereby engrossed, and every Tongue enquires whence it arose? what were its Causes? how it came about? and some, perhaps, go so far as to demand what its Consequences will be? If these People have no Answers given them they will devise Causes, divine Reasons, and guess at the *Court-Secret* 'till they either are, or think themselves right.

There wants not some who look upon the first of the Performances which I have undertaken to examine in this Light; that is, they believe the Author meant to give his own Conjectures to the World as this noble Person's Motives; others take the Thing in a quite different View: They believe him, if not dependent upon this great Man, at least an humble Friend and Retainer of his; one that had an Opportunity of hearing little Stories, and an
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Art of piecing together private Intelligence, which, in their Judgment, produc'd this Pamphlet: But he who undertook to answer it places the Affair in quite another Light; he will needs have it a *false* Apology, under Colour of which is introduced a *real* Indictment; he allows all the Sincerity of the Malice against those who are still great Men; but he is for explaining away that Attachment which the first Writer affects, for the great Person he pretends to defend. Whether this Gentleman be right or wrong in his Notion of the Author he undertakes to answer, without all Doubt he has set him upon that Foot which was fairest for his Purpose, and may therefore justly claim the Character of being a *Master* of his *Trade* as well as he. I shall take the Liberty of examining pretty closely the Colour which each of them has given to his Story; but as I have the Benefit of the *British* Nation in View, and that only as I undertake to sift this Measure no farther than as it may be useful in this Respect; so it is absolutely requisite for me not to set out at the same Period of Time with these Writers, but to take Things a little higher, that the Reader may have an Opportunity of enlarging his Prospect, take a Variety of Things into his View that are of infinitely greater
 Consequence

Consequence than many of those petty and personal Altercations, about which these Writers have spent, or rather wasted their Time. This RESIGNATION is certainly a Point of Moment to the People of *Great Britain*, and as such ought to be treated with Seriousness and Dignity; or, at least, this is the Light in which I consider, and the Manner in which I propose to treat it.

If we except a few of the first Years before the Government was thoroughly settled, there existed during the last and present Reign, to the Time of the breaking out of the present War, but two general Systems. The first was that of taking the Lead in *Europe*, laying Plans, and wide ones too of Empire and Government, and directing at the same Time the particular Frame of Things in this Island, and in a great Measure the general Scheme of Affairs through all that Part of the World with which, considered in a political Light, we have any Concern. It cannot be denied, even by such as disapprove that System, that it had much of Grandeur and not a little of Beauty; we were the Arbiters of the North; our Fleets rode triumphant in the *Baltick*; we made a Kind of War with *Sweden*; and we certainly made a Peace for that Crown, which, if not beneficial,

neficial, was at least expedient. We settled the Proportion of Power which might naturally induce us to think we held the Balance in the *North*, and thus much is within the Reach of our Memories ; that nothing could stir there but we took our Part in it ; and the Disputes of *Russia*, of *Poland*, *Sweden* and *Denmark*, were in those Days as much our Care, as afterwards the Jars in *Lower Saxony*, and the Controversies of the *German* Princes. We were busy also in the *South* ; our Fleets humbled the Pride of *Spain*, secured one Kingdom, and restored another to the House of *Austria*. In short, the Successors of the Earl of *Oxford*, I mean in Power, had the good Luck to experience the Wisdom of his Plan, and the Truth of the Maxim that he laid down, *that it would execute itself*. They actually divided the Interests of the House of *Bourbon*, and brought *France* to join with the House of *Austria* in defeating the Projects of *Spain*. Such were the Merits of that System, and such the Consequences of the Quadruple Alliance. But whatever Success we had abroad, we were far enough from being contented at Home ; the Execution of great Schemes is naturally attended with great Expence, and with other Difficulties also. Those who disliked this System mag-

nified these in their Speeches and Writings, and the disastrous Turn of the *South-Sea* Scheme so totally derang'd our domestic Administration, that an Alteration of Ministers, and consequently of Measures, could not be avoided; and this I take to be a pretty true History, or rather Representation of the political State of *Great Britain* to the Close of the Year 1720, taking in however no greater Space than that of four Years at the most.

Upon the Ruins of this, which I have already described, was built another, and a very different System. It was thought to stand on a narrower Bottom, and yet allowing the Case to be so, the Grounds of it were so well laid, that it seemed to rest upon a firmer Foundation, and actually subsisted for twenty Years. A Space so large, that I doubt whether the Records of our History can show its equal, at least under the Guidance and Direction of a single Person, one who derived his Favour from his Power; whereas all former Ministers stood indebted for their Power to their Sovereign's Favour. The Maxims of this new System lay either so deep as scarce to be discovered, or were otherwise of so variable a Nature, that they could scarce with any Propriety be so called.

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It has been stiled a System of Expedients, and 'till some better Appellation is found out, one may allow this to be a pretty right Name. For with respect to foreign Affairs, there was no settled Plan, except that of taking any Measures that might keep off a War; and in this Point of View, if it was not a great and glorious, it was at least a safe and trimming System. We did not affect to spread all our Sails, or to go before the Wind; we contented ourselves with a slow and gentle Motion, and were exempt from Storms and Tempests, tho' we might feel a little of Sea-sickness. At home Influence supplied the Place of Authority, and such timely Changes were made in the Administration, that notwithstanding it was composed from Time to Time of different Members, a few great Ones only excepted, its Appearance was pretty much the same. Some Difficulties indeed there were; but these were eluded for the present, and left, often too with good Success, to be overcome by Time.

The very Structure of this System made it alike obnoxious to Men of extensive Parts and of restless Spirits; the former despised, and the latter could not bear it. There was no Room in such an Administration for

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Men of Enterprize ; Proposals for making things better were but coldly received ; but any Advice to keep them as they were was readily embraced. Such as loved to be in Action found themselves out of their Element, and having no Chance for Employment in the State, were compelled in a Manner to fall in with the Opposition. This, by Degrees, made those formidable who were at first inconsiderable ; the Cloud that was but like a Man's Hand began at length to darken the Horizon, and the Sound was heard of Abundance of Rain. A System of Expedients can never be without Defects ; and when these come to be exposed by Men of quick Wits and volatile Abilities, they are soon shewn in such Lights as cannot be easily born. This, by Degrees, became the Case here, and tho' the calm and prudent Author of this pacific Administration had the Fortune, as rare as it was good, to be equally dear to two Princes ; yet Time and Chance, that on many Occasions had been his best Friends, failed him now and then, when his Antagonists pressed him so closely, that tho' his Dependants defended him with a Steadiness which himself could hardly expect ; yet, in a Course of Years, great Breaches were made ; and in the End a very trifling Incident, as a very small Weight, when
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the Balance is even, turned the Scale. That very kind of Craft, which had been so long his Support, became his Ruin and his Down-fal ; was brought on by that very Influence which had raised him, of which no Man knew the Force so well, or had better instructed others by his Example, to employ and urge it against himself.

We may now lay aside that figurative Language which political Rhethoric has taught us, and which is never so necessary or so useful, as in such Descriptions as these, which, according to the common Construction of Words, would require whole Volumes to discuss ; but by the Help of this metaphorical and expressive Diction, a few Paragraphs may contain and convey the Idea better than ordinary Language could have done in its utmost Extent. But when we are to speak of Matters of Fact, and those Matters of Fact of such a Nature, as to affect great Characters and Subjects of high Importance to this Nation ; it is necessary to use the plainest Words, and the most simple Stile imaginable, at least, for one who writes fairly and honestly, not with a View to screen one Man, or recommend another. All the World knows that the last capital Act of the late great Mi-

nister was the CONVENTION with SPAIN, concluded and ratified in *January 1739*: The Design of that Step was to make a strong and ultimate Effort to support the pacifick System; and tho' it seemed to be supported by an Address of the House of Lords, which was agreed to after a warm Debate, on the 1st of March following; yet it was supported in *form* only, and not in *effect*, tho' the Number were *ninety-five* against *seventy-four*. Whoever remembers the great Speaker upon that Occasion, cannot but remember also that the noble Person, who distinguished himself most in exposing the Folly of showing a Disposition to preserve Peace at any Rate; in magnifying the Indignities offered to the *British* Nation by the Crown of *Spain*, and the Impossibility of trading with that People, till full Satisfaction was obtained; as also the Impossibility of hoping for Redress by any other than vigorous Measures; will allow, that if he equalled *Demosthenes* in his *Oratory*, he equalled him also in his apparent Fondness for *War*, in his high Contempt of *Expedients*, and in his generous Concern, that the *Glory* of an ancient and free People should not be sacrificed to the *private Conveniency* of those who were in *Power*, and their *Friends*. Whoever consults
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the Protests signed upon the House's agreeing to the Address, will find a certain Name there, and will also find, that those who subscribed that Protest, considered the Convention exactly in the same Light in which I have placed it; that is to say, as the last Measure of a sinking Administration, the ultimate Effort of the Friends to the *pacifick System*, which they meant to condemn and render odious, by protesting against that Address. This had its Effect at home and abroad; in short it produced first *Reprisals* upon, and then a *War* with *Spain*, by which the System was demolished; tho' the Author of it kept his Ground a little longer, but kept it with Difficulty, pursued with the same Clamour, and hunted by the same Persons after the Change of the System as before, on pretence that he was *insincere*; and that tho' his *Actions* were *martial*, his *Intentions* were still as *pacifick* as ever.

In the succeeding year 1740, there were many Things of Importance that occurred, and which fully shewed the Sense of the wisest and greatest Men in the Nation, with respect to the State of publick Affairs, and the Management of them; but as I desire to be short, I will take notice only of *two* Things.

Things. The *first* is a Dispute that happened upon the Motion for an Address, which was occasioned by the K—— making use of the Words *Heats and Animosities*, in the last Paragraph of his Sp——ch from the Throne; it was said by those who opposed the M——r, that those Heats and Animosities were occasioned solely by his pertinaciously persisting in bearing the Injuries and Insults offered to this Nation by *Spain*, and a very great Stress was laid upon saying any thing in the Address, that might intimate there was so much as a *Party* in the Kingdom against the War with that Crown, which was positively asserted to be a *false Fact*; and if this was true, then the *British* Nation was unanimous in their Assent to the War with *Spain*. The *other* Instance I shall mention was the Address upon Admiral *Vernon's* Success in taking *Porto Bello*, in which these Words were made use of.

“ It affords the most reasonable Hopes and
 “ Expectations that, by the Blessing of
 “ God upon your Majesty's Councils and
 “ Arms, it may be attended with other
 “ important Advantages, and highly contribute to the obtaining *real* and effectual Security of those just Rights of Navigation and Commerce belonging to
 “ your Majesty's Subjects, for the Preservation

“ tion of which your Majesty entered into
 “ this necessary War.” An Objection was
 made to the Word printed above in *Italics*,
 upon a Supposition that it had the same
 Meaning as that which is coupled with it;
 but the Earl of *Abington* observing, that
Gibraltar and *Port Mahon* affording us
real Security for the Freedom of our Trade
 and Navigation in the *Mediterranean*, and
 that it was become necessary we should have
 the same sort of Security, for the Freedom
 of our Trade and Navigation in the *Ame-*
rican Seas, the Objection was given up.
 Thus then it is clear, that the Nation have
 a Right to suppose the Unanimity of the
 K——’s great Council, in the Approbation
 of *three* Points: *First*, That the War with
Spain was necessary: *Secondly*, That *Gibral-*
tar and *Port Mahon* are a *real* Security for
 our Trade and Navigation in the *Mediterranean*: *Thirdly*, That our Trade and Na-
 vigation in *America* can only be rendred
safe by our obtaining a *real* Security of the
 same Kind *there*.

In 1741, the most memorable publick
 Transaction was the Motion for removing
 the *Great Author* of the pacific System
 from his M——y’s Presence and Councils,
 and the Design of this was publicly de-
 clared

clared to be the condemning in a parliamentary Manner that System, which for so many Years he had supported and maintained. It is very true, that this Motion miscarried both in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons; but from the Protest upon rejecting that Motion in the former, we have a clear and incontestable Proof of the Sentiments of those who signed it, in reference to that System, which they condemned, and the opposite System, which they meant to substitute in its place; for the Emperor *Charles VI.* being now dead, there was an absolute Necessity of *Great-Britain's* declaring either her Adherence to her old System, or her Resolution to set up and carry to the utmost of her Power into Execution a new one. One Paragraph of this Protest will be fully sufficient for our Purpose, and demonstrate beyond the Power of Contradiction, what was the System *censured*; and by taking the contrary Measures from those therein condemned, and ranging them in proper Order, what was the System *approved*. This Paragraph then run thus, " Because
 " we apprehend that by the Conduct of
 " Sir *R. W.* in relation to foreign Affairs,
 " during the Course of his Administration,
 " the Balance of Power in *Europe* has been
 " destroyed,

“ destroyed, the House of *Bourbon* has
 “ been aggrandized in many Instances,
 “ particularly by the Addition of *Lorrain*;
 “ the House of *Austria* has been depressed
 “ by the Loss of Part of the Dutchy of
 “ *Milan*, and the whole Kingdom of *Na-*
 “ *ples* and *Sicily*; and if such a Change in
 “ the System of *Europe*, occasioned by the
 “ Misconduct of any Minister whatsoever,
 “ would be criminal, we cannot think it
 “ *the less* so, in *one* who joined in the Pro-
 “ secution of the Authors of the Treaty of
 “ *Utrecht*, upon the particular Charge of
 “ having reduced the House of *Austria*
 “ too low, and left the House of *Bourbon*
 “ too powerful.” There is one obvious
 Remark that can escape no Man, who reads
 this Paragraph with proper Attention, and
 with any reasonable Proportion of Judge-
 ment; which is this, that if it was fit and
 just to stamp such a Mark of Ignominy on
 a Man who could abet and support a System
 so agreeable to the Treaty of *Utrecht*, the
 Author of, which he had pursued and pro-
 secuted with the utmost Activity, it can
 never be right or reasonable to allow any
 Man’s Conduct to be either honest or lauda-
 ble, who, after *approving* this *Censure* for
this Reason, should notwithstanding be for
 concluding this War, by making a Peace
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upon the *same Terms*, or *worse* than those of the long decried Treaty of *Utrecht*.

In the Year 1742, upon the Meeting of the new Parliament, it very soon appeared that the Power of the *old Minister* was in its Wane; and that, as his System was demolished two Years before, and very narrowly escaped a parliamentary Condemnation the last Year; so it was impossible he should any longer retain the Shadow of his former Authority, or the Post of which he had been so long possessed. Upon his Removal another noble Person, characterised in the Apology by the Title of the *common Enemy*, came into the Direction of Affairs with the Assent, as it was understood, of the old Minister, and with very loud, if not general Acclamations from the People. We are not told by the *Apologist* what Sort of Man this new Minister was; unless being equally hated by those who *took him in*, and those who did not *go in* with him, and, being wild and drunk, may pass for a Character. Indeed what appears to me the strongest Proof that the noble Person apologized for could have no Hand in directing or approving that Piece, is the great Improbability that *one* Man of *Quality* should give *such* a Character of *another*. The Writer
of

of the *Resignation discuss'd* stept out of his Way to do this Lord Honour, and to speak of him in much milder Terms, and with much greater Deference for his Abilities, tho' he very fairly avows that his Schemes were impracticable. I cannot take upon me to be a Judge of this ; but it may be of some Use to the Reader if I observe, that this very same great Man had been in Power before, and had a great Share in promoting the *first* System, of which I have already given an Account, and was by Degrees excluded from his Share in the Administration for his known Dislike to the *second* System. It was very natural therefore to expect that, upon his being placed at the Helm, he would resume his *former* System, as he really did ; and it is for this Reason that I avoid calling it a third System, to prevent Perplexity and Confusion. In order to carry his Schemes into Execution, he went over with the late Field-Marshal, Earl of *Stair*, to *Holland*, returned soon after, and in a very short Space of Time went thither again a second Time. It is allowed that he found the *Dutch* very cautious, uneasy, and irresolute ; and whoever considers the Nature of *his* System, and of *our* Government, will find it no very difficult Matter to account for this Disposi-

tion of theirs, without having Recourse either to *French* Influence, or to *French* Money. The Risk they were to run in embracing their Share of his System was very great, and their Danger immediate ; no Wonder therefore that they were not hasty in closing with his Proposals, for they might naturally apprehend that, as his System had been before exploded, *after a short Trial* it might *be so* again ; and it is very apparent, that if they did think so they were not much mistaken.

In the next Year there was not only an open and avowed Opposition formed against this Minister's System, but it was also carried to a very great Height, as all the World must remember ; for in this Year commenced the great Controversy about the *Hanover* Troops. A Controversy of a very singular Nature, as will fully appear to the Reader at this Juncture, if he will please to recollect one Circumstance that happened before it, and several others that have happened since. When the War with *Spain* was once declared, a War with *France* was soon apprehended, and the Grounds of this Apprehension appeared so rational, that Notice was taken of them in Addresses to the Throne, and Assurances given to his M——
of

of the most dutiful and affectionate Support from his Subjects, if by the Prosecution of *one* War the *other* became necessary. But these Apprehensions growing stronger, and withal a Demand being made by the Queen of *Hungary*, for that Assistance from us to which she stood intitled from Treaties, the *old Minister* then in Power thought it reasonable to augment the Army ; but this was violently opposed for two Reasons : First, Because the War with *Spain* did not require any Augmentation of our Forces : And secondly, Because the best Way to assist the Queen of *Hungary* was by hiring foreign Troops for her Service. Yet, when the *Hanoverian* Troops were for that very Purpose taken into our Service, this was condemned as an unjust and impolitic Measure ; and it was said that we might have hired other Troops cheaper. It has been since found expedient to hire Troops at a higher Rate, and it has been also found no easy Matter to get them even at that Rate, or, in Truth, at any Rate at all. Whatever might therefore be thought in those Days of Clamour and Discontent, most certainly if such a System as an Opposition to that lately overturned, was laid down in the Protest against Sir *R. W.* was to be supported and maintained ; this was not only a very expedient,

expedient, but a very necessary Measure ; and yet the declaring it such was as strongly controverted and as obstinately opposed in the most august Assembly of this Kingdom, as any Thing ever was that came under Debate there. The great *Minister*, who in the *Apology* is stiled the *Common Enemy*, did not lose his Spirits upon this, or resolve to abandon the Plan he formed. On the contrary, he went forward and pushed his Schemes with great Vigilance and Vigour ; and notwithstanding all that is said of the Coldness and Backwardness of the *D—b* by us, at this Juncture, and especially by the *Apologist* throughout his whole Pamphlet, yet they are at this very Instant *suffering* for not being so cold and backward as it is said by us they were. To prove this I must refer my Readers to the Reply lately published by the FRENCH Court to the Answer given to the States-General to their Memorials, in which it is expressly affirmed, that the Republic went *fully* into the *sanguine Schemes* against *France*, divested herself thereby of her Quality of Auxiliary, became a principal Party in the War, and thereby justly exposed herself to be treated in such a Manner as she has been, and is still treated by the most Christian K—. I cannot tell how to reconcile this
Fact

Fact either to the heavy Charges brought against the late M—r for going such Lengths without the Concurrence of the *D—b*, or to the indecent Reflections made upon that whole Nation throughout the whole *Apology*. But it is hoped that whenever an *authentic* Account of the *Resignation* appears, which is now become necessary, and it is said cannot long be with-held, we shall see this Matter set in its true Light by the *Hand* in the World *most* capable of such a Performance.

By Degrees the Objections raised against the received System appeared so strong, and the Opposition against the Minister, who was looked upon as the *Patron* of that *Scheme*, became so very formidable, that many of his Collegues in the Administration began to see plainly there was no such Thing as keeping the Machine in Motion, or, in short, of carrying on the public Affairs without removing various Incumbrances. It was their Sense of this that produced the Treaty for a Coalition, or the *Broad-Bottom Treaty*, as the *Apologist* calls it, with which his Performance commences. The Author of the *Resignation discussed* complains, that the Writer before-mentioned did not previously set forth the *Principles*
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of those who were *taken in* by that Treaty, and I cannot see why his Reader should not complain of him for the very same Fault. But I can easily see what was his Motive; he acted wholly upon the Defensive, and therefore would not stir a Foot from the Post he meant to maintain. This Point however is now cleared up, and the Reader has seen that Part of those who acted so warmly, and so effectually in overturning the pacific System, grew very soon displeased with that System, which it was supposed they would have readily embraced, and thereby rendered it impossible for that Part of the *old* Ministry, which had for some Time adopted the revived System, to proceed upon the Plan that had been laid down for its Execution; and it was from the Concurrence of these Dispositions on one Side or the other that the Right Honourable the Earl of *Granville* resigned the Seals, as Secretary of State; which was published in the *London Gazette* of *Saturday November* the 24th, 1744, and by that Resignation made Way for carrying the *Broad-Bottom Alliance* into Execution.

The Account the *Apologist* gives of the Terms upon which the noble Person he defends came into Power, are very extraordinary; and

and if he had them not from *indisputable* Authority, it was certainly a very rash Thing to publish them ; he might, for any Thing one can see, have been very well justified in disliking the Conduct of the War ; the natural Consequence of which was desiring to see an End put to it by a safe and solid Peace, the only End a wise Man and a worthy Patriot could wish for. But it is not possible to find out the Reasons which could induce a Man of great Parts, and as his Actions as well as Professions had hitherto shewn him a Man of disinterested Probity, to assist, or even connive at an Imposition on his — by Pretences of Zeal for carrying on the War, when in Reality no such Thing was intended. It is still more strange, and more unaccountable, to hear it pretended, that to facilitate this Scheme, he undertook an Em——y to H——d with Letters Credentials so directly opposite to those Intentions, in which he was immovably fixed. The Author of the *Resignation discussed* treats this Matter very softly, and just hints at a *Memorial*, which, he says, proves that noble Person had quite a different Opinion of the D——b, from what he is reported to have had by his *Apologist* : This Affair is now become so very serious, and the People of G——t-B——n seem so

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universally

universally disposed to see all these *Farces* of *State* examined to the bottom, and to know the *true* Characters and *real* Views, of those who in this critical Conjunction have the *Management* of their *Affairs*; that I cannot dispense with the bare mention of this Memorial, but must take the Liberty of quoting two Passages from it. Passages which, when compared with the *Apology*, will make that appear a very strange thing; or this a very strange *Memorial*.

The first is with Regard to the Sameness of his M——y's Notions, and those of the D——b, for the Truth of which he makes himself responsible to the —— his M——r, the Republick, and the *British* Nation. These are his Words: “ The close Union
 “ of the two Nations is neither the Effect
 “ of some transient Views, nor the Fruit
 “ of accidental Conjunctions; but a right
 “ Consequence of our reciprocal and inva-
 “ riable Interests. Nature pointed it out
 “ to us, in placing us, as she has done, and
 “ the uninterrupted Experience of almost
 “ a Century does not permit us to be igno-
 “ rant, that our mutual Prosperity depends
 “ on our Union. This Truth is so indis-
 “ putable, that we ought to look upon as
 “ our

“ our common Enemies, all those who
 “ presume to call it in Question. Vicinity
 “ is to most Nations nothing else but a
 “ fatal Source of Jealousy and Discord;
 “ whereas we have the singular Happiness
 “ of being Neighbours in a Manner fit to
 “ procure us infinite Advantages, without a
 “ Possibility of any Distrust or Umbrage
 “ arising therefrom, if we do not forget
 “ our grand Interests. Such are the King’s
 “ Notions; and by what I have observed
 “ myself, I will dare to assure him, that
 “ your High Mightinesses are in the same
 “ way of thinking. Who can be ignorant
 “ of it? Our Allies know it, our Enemies
 “ feel it. *Europe* has already often reaped
 “ the precious Fruits of our Harmony:
 “ What ought it not yet to expect from
 “ it?”

The next Passage relates to the Reception
 that he himself met with, to the Sense he
 had of it, and to the Obligation he thought
 himself under of making that publicly
 known to the whole World; the Words of
 the Memorial are these. “ As for what
 “ relates to myself, High and Mighty Lords,
 “ nothing more pleasing could happen to
 “ me, than being charged for the second
 “ Time with the King’s Orders, near your
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“ High Mightinesses, especially in an Oc-
 “ casion where the Business was to concert
 “ Means to perform the Engagements,
 “ which I contributed to form some Years
 “ ago. I shall never forget the kind Re-
 “ ception I met with then, and at present
 “ from your High Mightinesses, and my
 “ Gratitude will end but with my Days;
 “ but if your High Mightinesses will vouch-
 “ safe to remember me, view me, High
 “ and Mighty Lords, only on the Side of
 “ my sincere Zeal for the common Good of
 “ both Nations, my respectful Veneration for
 “ your Government, and, if I may presume
 “ to use the Expression, my tender Attach-
 “ ment to this Republick. Done at the
 “ *Hague, May 18, 1745.*”

The next great and publick Transaction
 that occurs in this Dispute, (for I profess
 not to meddle with little ones) is the *gene-
 ral Resignation*, by which Name I chuse to
 call it, in order to distinguish it from partial
 and particular Resignations. This the *Apo-
 logist* gives us an Account in such Terms
 as represents it as a publick Measure, dictat-
 ed by private Resentment, carried on with
 private Views, and concluded by the Esta-
 blishment of private Advantages. The Au-
 thor of the *Resignation discussed* has retorted
 this

this very strongly, and to be sure has very fully proved, that this same general Resignation was a very strict and literal Adherence to the original *Coalition Treaty*. But there is one thing in which both these Writers have fallen short, and with respect to which, if they had meant the full Satisfaction of the Publick, it became them to have insisted most. I mean what were the Sentiments expressed by this noble Person upon that Occasion. If he treated it in the manner the *Apologist* seems to hint, this was certainly a Desertion of the Broad Bottom Treaty; or in other Words, a Desertion of those Principles upon which this *Apologist* founds the *late* Resignation. On the other Hand, if he did not treat it in this Light, but in the direct contrary, which was broadly insinuated at the Time of the general Resignation, it is a very singular Proceeding to give *such* a turn to it now; and a Proceeding that, however expedient it may be as things stand at present, by no Means reconcilable to that Candour, Ingenuity, and Frankness, with which the History of *this Resignation*, if it was necessary to write it at all, ought to have been written. Nor will it much mend the Matter with respect to the *Apology*, if this noble Person was really silent upon that Occasion;

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for tho' it must be allowed that might not only be a very cautious and prudent, but a very wise and well meaning Behaviour at the Time; yet to come at such a distance as this, and upon so extraordinary and particular an Occasion, to *explain* the Grounds of it in this manner, is taking such an Advantage as places that *Silence* in quite another Light. In a Light as disadvantageous, as the Conduct of the noble Person, supposing it such, was at that ticklish Conjunction, just and circumspect. In short, it is a Point that ought not to have been *touched upon* on either Side, if it could not have been fully and positively *made out*. Reserve at the Time was both justifiable and seasonable, and for that very Reason all future Explication became improper, because they seem to be called forth by some subsequent *Turn*, and it may be suspected that they receive some Tincture from *that* Turn, which they are *produced to serve*.

All this will appear yet in a stronger and more glaring Light when we come to consider the next *Resignation*, which, 'till the *Apologist* handled it, was looked upon as a Matter of small Moment, and in that Light it is still placed by his *Antagonist*. But if this be a false Light, then we ought to con-

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sider *this* Resignation in the very same Point of View in which the *Apologist* would place the *last Resignation* ; the necessary Consequence of which is, that no natural or justifiable Account can be given for the subsequent Conduct of *both* the noble Persons the *Apologist* affects so much to commend. As to slight and personal Differences between Ministers, without doubt the Nation has very little to do with them ; but when things come to such a Pass, that a Minister cannot serve in a great Office, in a Manner *worthy* of an *Englishman*, which must be the Case when his Resignation is commended as an Act highly *suitable* to that Character ; it is equally hard to comprehend how, after the Resignation of that Office, another very high Post should be accepted by the *same* Person without any Change of Ministers or Measures ; or how the Post so quitted, should be filled by the other noble Person with such universal Approbation. These are *Secrets of State*, that ought either to be covered with *impenetrable Darknes*, or whenever they are brought to open *View* should be explained with the utmost *Perspicuity*. The not doing this is calling the People to hear and determine a Cause without *Evidence*. It is preferring an *Indictment* without *Witnesses* ; it is *appealing* to the *Public* without
Proof,

Proof, and therefore all that can be expected from the Public in such a Case, is to call *loudly* for the *Proofs*, without which it is impossible for them to determine any Thing; or at least, any Thing but this, that while the Affairs of the Nation were in the utmost Perplexity, when her most essential Interests were at Stake, and her most momentous Concerns in the utmost Danger, *those* who ought to have been employed in *taking Care of them*, were either disputing among themselves about *Trifles*; or if their Disputes were of *greater Consequence*, they must have arose from Causes not *proper* for the *public Ear*. How unlike such a Proceeding as this is to give general Satisfaction, to raise our Credit either with Friends or Foes Abroad, or to calm the Minds of the People at Home; I need not say the Thing speaks itself, and is thoroughly *explained* from this *Want of Explanation*. I do not mean to *play* upon Words, but to shew how improper, how indiscreet, how indecent it is for Writers to *play* with *Matters* of such Importance, when they have it not in their *Power* to treat them in the *serious* Manner they ought to be treated.

Several Points that are next examined and disputed between these two Writers seem not to be yet altogether ripe for any clear
and

and certain Decision. If one can make any Thing of them it amounts to no more than this, that there seems to have been a Trial of Skill between two Ministers in Posts of the same Nature, who should engross *the Secret*, and thereby the upper-hand in the Cabinet. This, by extraordinary Application and Address, seemed at first to lean *one Way*; but in Process of Time, and in Consequence of a certain Negotiation of Peace, at length leaned the *other Way*; for which the *Person* charged with *that* important Negotiation was most dreadfully abused. I must confess I can discern some Intrigue and Management, and a great deal of Heat and Resentment in these Transactions, supposing them to be on both Sides fairly stated; but I am very far from being edified with the Conduct of either. Disputes of such a Nature, and on such Occasions, can never tend to the *Service* of the *Nation*; nor is it easy to perceive any very good Effects that can follow from the Publication of them. One Thing only is clear, that the great End sought by the Coalition, whatever that End was, became plainly defeated by these Disputes, and by nothing else. If, as on one Side is pretended, it was the *giving up of the War*, and, at all Events, concluding a speedy *Peace*, it is on the same

Side confessed, that this was departed from by *all* Parties; for those that were *taken in*, as well as those that *took them in*, were *carried away by the Torrent*, and for a Time at least concurred in promoting martial Measures. On the other Hand, if, as the other Writer asserts, the real View of the Coalition, and the great End of the Broad-bottom Treaty was to carry on an *English War*; this was either not clearly understood by *both* Parties, or if, as the Truth seems to be, it was at first so understood and pursued, they soon untwisted again, and crossed each other's Measures. The *Apologist* says, that those who promoted the War defeated their own Measures: This may be true, but it is very improbable, and we have only his Word for it. His *Antagonist* says, their Measures were *crossed* by *those* they *took in* to promote them; this is not only more probable, but, in several Instances, is inadvertently confessed by the other Writer: It happens a little unluckily for the Public, that tho' they cannot get entirely into the Secret of *how, why, or wherefore* they were crossed, yet they cannot help being truly sensible of the Fact, that they *have been crossed*, and since the *Apology* was published, have had the Mortification of seeing a *very large* Sum of public Money granted to discharge the
Expence

Expence incurred by making a *Conquest*, which in that Pamphlet is represented as *not worth keeping*, and hardly worth *Thanks* if we give it back. These are melancholy Reflections, but they are such Reflections as, upon reading these Pieces, it is impossible for a Man to keep out of his Head. How prudent it might be to disclose them to all the World, and to disclose them first abroad, for the *Apology* is directed to a Gentleman at the *Hague*, I shall not take upon me to determine. But since they are disclosed, the Publick seems to have acquired a Right to a *better Account* of them, which I believe it will not be long before they receive, and that for a *Reason* which will be presently given.

There is in the *Apology*, amongst other extraordinary Pieces of News, the following Account of a Transaction, in itself very remarkable; and made more so by the manner in which this Author has dressed it up. His Antagonist, not without some Shew of Reason, disputes his Representation of it: but however, let us first see what it was, and then perhaps we shall find some other Relation, of as good or perhaps better Credit, with which it may be compared; and then we

shall be able to guess at its Authenticity, and of the Regard that ought to be paid to it. The Account then of this martial Atchievement runs thus. “ It is known to all *Europe*, that General *Ligonier* was made a “ Prisoner at *La Valle* ; but not so universally how much Honour he acquired in “ Exchange for his Liberty. It has been “ said, that he owed his Misfortune to his “ Rashness : And it must be owned, that a “ Man, who with but thirty Squadrons “ ventures to charge one hundred and fifty, “ does at first Sight seem liable to such an “ Imputation. But the Characters of Actions cannot be fairly given, unless a due “ Regard be shewn to the Circumstances “ which attend them. Now the whole “ Body of Infantry, under the Command “ of His R—— H—— the D——, were “ exposed to the Fury of these hundred “ and fifty Squadrons, and nothing but the “ desperate Attack in Question could have “ saved them from being cut to Pieces, or “ secured the Person of his R—— H——, “ or preserved *Maestricht*, which had otherwise fallen into the Hands of the Enemy the same Evening. Whereas they “ were so surprized and so disordered by “ the Diversion which the General had “ thus

“ thus gallantly and seasonably made, that
 “ his R—— H—— had sufficient time to
 “ recover *Maestricht*, and to post his Troops
 “ in Safety, on the other Side of the *Meuse*.”

We had an Account of this Battle published in the *Gazette*, dated *Whitehall*, *June* the 27th, 1747, and said to be directed by his R—— H—— the D—— to a *certain noble Person* then S———y of S——. Let us see how far it agrees, or can be made agree with the Apologist's Story.

“ In the Morning, says this Account,
 “ about Break of Day (*June* the 21st,
 “ 1747) the Enemy made several Counter-
 “ marches over against us, and at nine in
 “ the Morning we judged that they had
 “ no farther Design to attack us that Day;
 “ when soon after, Sir *John Ligonier* sent
 “ Lieutenant Colonel *Forbes* to acquaint his
 “ R—— H—— that he imagined the Enemy
 “ was just going to attack us, or to endeavour
 “ to out flank us and cut us off from
 “ *Maestricht*. Upon which his R—— H——
 “ went immediately to the Left, and de-
 “ fired the Marshal to put the Right instantly
 “ under Arms. About an Hour
 “ after that his R—— H—— was arrived
 “ there,

“ there, and had made his Dispositions, and
 “ placed his Batteries, the Enemy appeared
 “ formed in a deep Column, twelve Batta-
 “ lions a-breast, in order to attack a small
 “ Enclosure, with about four or five small
 “ Houses in it, where we had four Battalions
 “ posted; and about that Village alone almost
 “ the whole of the Action was, which last-
 “ ed about four Hours, after it had been
 “ taken and retaken four times; and when
 “ we had made ourselves Masters of it, by
 “ the Assistance of our own detached Troops,
 “ which came to us from the Right, the
 “ Line of Foot without the Village began
 “ to give way a little; they were however
 “ again put in Order. His R—— H——
 “ then went to form that Part of the Ca-
 “ valry which had been in Disorder, but
 “ found himself cut off by some Squadrons
 “ of *French* Cavalry which had broke in,
 “ and was obliged to retire to our Cavalry,
 “ who by that time had charged and broke
 “ the Enemies first Line; and afterwards,
 “ while his R—— H—— was with them,
 “ charged a second time, and broke the E-
 “ nemy again; but pursuing them too far,
 “ received a Fire from some Foot who lay
 “ behind the Hedges, which gave the *French*
 “ Cavalry time to form again, and then
 “ they

“ they forced ours to retire. In the mean
 “ time our Infantry retreated towards *Ma-*
 “ *estricht*, to the Place where we joined.
 “ His R—— H—— marched towards *Lu-*
 “ *nakin* with all the Cavalry, to favour the
 “ Retreat of the *Dutch* and the Right
 “ Wing, which was effected so successful-
 “ ly, that they lost nothing but some few
 “ Men by Cannon Shot. Sir *John Ligo-*
 “ *nier* and Count *Isenbourg* had the Misfor-
 “ tune to be taken in the last Attack that
 “ our Horſe made.”

I ſhall not trouble the Reader with any
 Remarks upon theſe Accounts, he has them
 before him, and may decide for himſelf,
 whether they are conſiſtent or not; and if
 the World ſhould agree in thinking them
 inconfiſtent, there is no Doubt to be made,
 that where ſuch great Names have been ſo
 freely mentioned, the Matter will be cleared
 up, and ſo no Doubt will the Affair of the
 Meſſage. But I muſt however freely con-
 feſs, that declaring Peace at the Head of the
 Armies, upon Terms which, however mode-
 rate, were plainly preſcribed by *France*, might
 very eaſily ſhock *Britiſh* Miniſters, who have
 any Delicacy, any Concern, for the Repu-
 tation of their Country, any Remembrance
 of

of her former Glory, and how unusual a thing it has been for her to *submit* to *Peace* upon such Terms. I know very well, that the Peace of *Ryswick* has been mentioned as a Precedent upon this Occasion ; it was a Peace offered by *France*, it was a Peace negotiated if not concluded in the *Field*. But then there are *two* things to be considered, the *first* is, that in the Peace of *Ryswick* infinitely better Terms were granted to the Allies ; granted, did I say ? no, they were insisted upon, and *Lewis XIV.* thought fit to acquiesce : so that there the *French* did not *prescribe*, but *accept* a Peace. In the *next* Place, that very Peace was made with a deep Design, upon which followed the two *Partition* Treaties, which at the long run threw the Kingdom of *Spain* into the Hands of the *House* of *Bourbon*. If therefore the Treaty of *Ryswick* ought to be considered as a Precedent, it may be justly doubted, whether it is a Precedent we should incline to follow. But if this after all comes out to be the Case, we may do it at any time ; for *France* will never be backward in making Propositions of the same Nature. She knows her own Interest *too well* to be negligent in that Point ; and if we are at any time so very sick of the War, as to be glad to catch
at

at such a kind of Peace, we may be pretty confident that she will let it hang in our *Reach*; for to get us once more under her Influence, by reestablishing an Opinion of her Moderation, seems to be, of all others, the thing she affects *most*; and with good Reason; for while we remain captivated by such an Opinion, she has all things to hope, and nothing to fear. Her Ambition may then have full Scope, and while she is gratifying it by her *Intrigues*, she may be restoring her shattered *Marine*, and encouraging that *Commerce*, which by this War, as *weary* as we are of it, we have almost *destroyed*, with no small Advantage to our own. But how this Advantage will be *secured* by the making *such* a *Peace*, I hope Experience will never teach us.

As to the subsequent Proposal from *Spain*, it has been *produced* on one side, and very *politically* discussed on the other: only one thing I beg leave to add, which is this, that the Completion of such a Peace would have been in the very Teeth of those Rules

so unanimously laid down in Parliament. For if the present War, and I think we are still at War with *Spain*, was *necessary*, it must continue *so*, till the *Ends* that *made* it *necessary* are *gained*. If *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon* are real Securities for our Trade and Navigation in the *Mediterranean*, we can never bear the most *distant Hint* of purchasing a Peace by giving either of them *up*. If no real Security can be had for our Trade and Navigation in *America*, but by obtaining such *cautionary Places* there, some Mention of a thing of this Sort ought to have *attended* those *Proposals*, or it might have been dangerous for Ministers to meddle with them. There are many things to be considered in *Peace-making*, and though this be the undoubted Prerogative of the Crown, yet the Consequences of the *Treaty of Utrecht* shew us, that Ministers are accountable, when they take upon themselves to make *use* of that *Authority*; and the Censures so near passing upon a *late* Minister, not for *Peace-making* but for *Peace-keeping*, will, or at least ought to be a *Memento* to his Successors.

fors. But it is now time to draw to a Conclusion, for Dissertations upon publick Affairs, which neither point out any *End*, or recommend any *Means*, are mere political *Cobwebs*, which hang upon the Walls, not only without Use, but with such a degree of Disgrace, as very well deserves that they should be *swept down*. To prevent a Fate therefore so disagreeable, not to the Vanity only, but to the rational and just Pride of an Author, I shall sum up all with a very few Reflections, that seem to me to arise from the Subject I have been handling, and that Impartiality with which I hope I have handled it.

We have seen from a clear Deduction of *Facts*, that hitherto we have only rung the *Changes* upon different *Systems* to very little Purpose. If we could have been contented with the *pacifick* Scheme, it is not easy to say why we were so much bent upon *getting rid* of it; and the old Minister said truly, as well as wisely, *that if his Removal only was to be purchased by a War, the Na-*

tion had a very dear Bargain. Yet this seems to be the Bargain that some People were very early inclined to drive, if it be true, that the fundamental Article of the *Coalition Treaty* was the making Peace again as soon as might be. Indeed there is this to be said for that State of the Case, that a very considerable Part of our wise and steady *Patriots* continued to *oppose* the *War*, when it was vigorously and not unsuccessfully made; I mean immediately after the Battle of *Dettingen*, with the same *Zeal* and *Spirit* which they had exerted to *drive us into it*. But to drive a Nation into a War, and then drive her out again before the *Ends* for which *themselves* declared the War to be *necessary* were attained, or like to be attained, is a Scheme of Policy so refined, as to stand much above the reach of *common Sense*. But it may be urged, that after all the pacifick System appears by Experience to be the easiest managed, and the most lasting. The Question is, whether it will be always so, or whether it be likely that the Ministers who restore that System, will

will be able to maintain themselves in Power as long as he did, that had the Management of that System in better Times, when Affairs abroad were less perplexed, and when our Domestick Concerns were in a much better Condition. Nay granting even this to be possible, can we suppose it will ever be agreeable to *this Nation*, to see the very *same Men* establishing themselves in Power by the *revival* of that System, which with so much Heat and Violence they laboured to destroy, which they accomplished at such a prodigious *Expence* of *Blood* and *Treasure*, and which might have been much cheaper *preserved*, by adding *Convention* to *Convention*, and preferring *Spithead* to *Mediterranean* Expeditions? This is a Point which, how *little* soever they may think of it, will, if ever they venture to make a *Peace*, employ the *Thoughts* of many of their *fellow Subjects*, in a Manner perhaps not much to their Advantage.

The other and opposite System, of a *vigorous War*, is said to have been found impracticable.

practicable. This ought however to have been considered before it was undertaken; for tho' it must be allowed, that it was constantly opposed from the Time it was undertaken, yet nobody can deny that it was in express Terms recommended by the Paragraph heretofore cited, from a famous Protest subscribed by the *very Persons* that so early opposed it, and now would pass that early Opposition upon us as a Mark of Consistency with their present Principles. But let them say what they will, they must deliver themselves from this *Dilemma*, before they can re-instate themselves in their *old* Character of *Patriots*. If a vigorous War in support of the Balance of Power, and the Weight of the House of *Austria* was not a right Measure, why did they *recommend* it, or insist on the Condemnation of a Minister for pursuing, as they asserted, a contrary Conduct? If it was a right Measure, why did they so soon *oppose*, and by the Warmth of their Opposition defeat it? The Measures taken for the Execution of that System, tho' they are now stiled *wild* and

and *drunken*, were once thought great and glorious, not only by us, but by all our Allies, and even by our Enemies. It may be worth while to prove this. The Empress Queen of *Hungary* concurred in them, and it is very well known expressed great Concern, when she saw this System on the Point of changing. The Steadiness of the King of *Sardinia* was owing to them, for the Conclusion of the *Treaty of Worms* fixed him to our Side, and determined him to reject all the Overtures that were made him. The *French* affirm, that the *Dutch* came fully into these Measures; this is the crying Sin with which they charge them, and for committing which *Saxe* and *Lowendbal* have been sent to chastise them. It was by these Measures, and these only, that *France* was terrified, as she confesses herself in that Reply to the Answer of the States General to her Memorials, which has been before cited. But if after all this Scheme was *impracticable*, it was our Misfortune that it was not foreseen before it was attempted, before we spent so much Money in endeavouring

vouring its Execution, and before we entered into Treaties from the Engagements contracted, by which we still remain undischarged, unless we can be discharged by calling them *wild* and *drunken* Engagements; which is certainly a new Way of getting rid of Alliances, reserved for the *Politicians* of our Times, and hid from the Eyes even of *Macbiavel* himself, tho' I cannot tell whether they may not be deduced from the political Principles of *Hobbes*.

We have however tried what a *middle Way* would do, and between the *Apologist* and his *Antagonist*, there has been more said in Favour of it than I believe any Body imagined possible; and if no other Good has been derived from it, it looks like the more honourable Way to Peace. The Remainder of the *old* Ministry, who had been forced into a War, acted consistently enough in recurring to this *middle Way*, when they found the other rendered impracticable, not more by the *Superiority* of the *Enemy* Abroad, than by the *Weight* of a *powerful*
Opposition

Opposition at Home. A Weight that hung so heavy upon their Measures, that it was no Wonder they moved slow. A Weight that made it absolutely necessary for them to make use of an untoward Expedient to rid themselves in Appearance of the *H—n—r* Troops, upon which the Loss of the Battle of *Fontenoy* hath been charged, and that again objected to them as a Crime. According to the same Logic, the Loss of the Battle of *Raucoux* has been placed to their Account, together with that of *Valle*; the Loss of *Bergen-op-zoom*, and, no Doubt, *Maestricht* will make another *Item*. But the *Apologist*, in making these Charges, opened a Way for their Defence, of which the Public is in Possession, and will judge whether they have done *all* that they *could* do or not.

The winding up of the Bottom is this: That hitherto every System has failed us from one and the same Cause, the *Want* of *Unanimity*; and if all our Losses, all our Disappointments, all our Disputes would

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but

but terminate in restoring *Unanimity*, I dare prophecy, that if, after mature Deliberation, we made Choice of *any* System, we might be able to extricate ourselves from the Difficulties we are under with *Reputation*, and support the Measures we thought fit to take with *Dignity* and *Honour*. But while we remain an uneasy, fickle, factious, restless and divided People, it is impossible that we should do any Thing that is great, either in the *Field* or in the *Cabinet*. Let us then, at last, resolve upon what ought to have been our Choice at first ; let us forget the *Faults* of some, and overlook the *Overights* of others, for the sake of ALL. This is the only Method that is left, and if not practised very soon, we have no Security that even this will long be *left us*. We have yet vast *Resources*, if we do not *waste* them by our *Folly*, or *doubt* of them from *Despair* : We can never employ them better than at this *critical Juncture*, when every Thing is at Stake. At all Times UNION is requisite and laudable, at present it is *absolutely necessary* ; if we *unite* we may be *safe* ; but
I
if

if we protract, delay, and continue to *quarrel* amongst *ourselves*, we must be *undone*, become the Prey of our *Enemies*, and the Derision of those who once thought it their highest Honour to be stiled our *Friends*.
AVERT IT HEAVEN !

F I N I S.

The first of these is the fact that the
 system of the present day is not a
 new one, but a continuation of the
 old one, and that the principles of
 the system are the same as those of
 the old system. The second is the fact
 that the system is not a new one, but
 a continuation of the old one, and that
 the principles of the system are the same
 as those of the old system.

